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Abstract—With the support of cloud computing, large 
quantities of data collected from various WSN applications can 
be managed efficiently. However, maintaining data security and 
efficiency of data processing in cloud-WSN (C-WSN) are 
important and challenging issues. In this paper, we present an 
efficient data outsourcing scheme based on CP-ABE, which can 
not only guarantee secure data access, but also reduce overall 
data processing time. In our proposed scheme, a large file is 
divided into several data blocks by data owner (DO) firstly. Then, 
the data blocks are encrypted and transferred to the cloud server 
in parallel. For data receiver (DR), data decryption and data 
transmission is also processed in parallel. In addition, data 
integrity can be checked by DR without any master key 
components. The security analysis shows that the proposed 
scheme can meet the security requirement of C-WSN. By 
performance evaluation, it shows that our scheme can 
dramatically improve data processing efficiency compared to the 
traditional CP-ABE method. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In order to enhance the scalability of the WSN, some 
studies focus on combining cloud computing and wireless 
sensor networks [1]. Security in WSN has been studied in a lot 
of literature, e.g., [2-5].With the support of cloud computing, 
cloud-WSN (C-WSN) can be constructed. It can be viewed as 
a special kind of Heterogeneous Sensor Networks [6-8]. C-
WSN has been used in many applications, such as smart grid. 
In smart grid, there are lots of WSN based applications, 
including power transmission line monitoring, smart metering 
& smart home, power consumption information gathering, etc. 
Mass data from different WSN applications are collected and 
stored in cloud servers. Then, different type of data receivers 
(DR) will access the data according to their own access rights. 
However, there are still several problems and challenges in 
C-WSN. First, data processing efficiency should be considered 
due to large amount of data is encrypted/decrypted and 
transferred in C-WSN. Second, data security and data privacy 
must be kept in mind.  To solve these problems, we propose an 
efficient data outsourcing scheme, which can 
dramatically enhance data processing efficiency in C-WSN 
without loss of data security and data privacy. Main 
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) 
We propose a block-encryption method which allows a large 
file to be encrypted/decrypted and transmitted in blocks in 
parallel. 2) The data receiver can check data integrity without 
any master key components. 3) We give the security analysis 
and performance evaluation, which prove that security and 
performance of our scheme are no weaker than that of 
traditional scheme.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the related work. In section 3, some preliminaries 
are given. In section 4, our scheme is stated. In section 5, 
security analysis is given. In Section 6, the performance of our 
scheme is evaluated. In Section 7, the paper is concluded. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In [9], the ciphertext’s encryption policy is associated with 
a set of attributes, and the data owner can be offline after data 
is encrypted.  In [10] and [11], Key Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme and Ciphertext Policy 
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme were proposed 
respectively. In KP-ABE, the encryption policy is also 
associated with a set of attributes, which are organized into a 
tree structure (named access tree) by users. In CP-ABE, the 
data owner constructs the access tree using visitors’ identity 
information. 
In [12], Yu et al tried to achieve secure, scalable, and fine-
grained access control in a cloud environment. Wang et al 
proposed an access control scheme based on CP-ABE, which 
was also secure and efficient in a cloud environment [13]. In 
[14], Yadav and Dave presented an access model based on CP-
ABE which could provide a remote integrity check by way of 
augmenting secure data storage operations. In addition, there 
are still some researches and applications of access control in 
practical problems, e.g., [15, 16]. Hei et al applied the access 
control scheme to the medical field, in order to solve the 
various problems in practice. They firstly discussed and 
studied how to detect the two attacks against insulin pump 
systems via wireless links in [15], and the feasibility of the 
scheme is proved by experiments. Then in [16], Hei et al 
considered the Implantable Medical Devices (IMD) security, 
and proposed a light-weight secure access control scheme. 
With the small computation overhead, the scheme can be 
applied to solve the security problems in emergency situations. 
The similarity between the existing works and ours is that 
we are all based on ABE method. While, we make an 
innovation and improvements based on CP-ABE. In order to 
enhance the data processing efficiency in C-WSN, we propose 
a novel partition method based on CP-ABE to enable the data 
encryption and data transmission to be processed in parallel. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions 
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime 
order p and g be the generator of G0. The bilinear map e 
is, 0 0 1:e G G G → , for all , pa b :  
• Bilinearity： 1, , ( , ) ( , )
a b abu v G e u v e u v  =  
• Non-degeneracy: ( , ) 1e g g   
• Symmetric: ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b ab b ae g g e g g e g g= =  
Definition  Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: 
      Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and 
g be its generator, given Ry G as input, try to get 
px  that
xy g= . 
      The DL assumption holds in G if it is computationally 
infeasible to solve DL problem in G. 
B. Structure in Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based Encryption 
(CP-ABE) 
To achieve fine-grained access control, we utilize the 
Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme (CP-
ABE) [4], which the access structure is illustrated by an 
access tree. Leaves of the tree are associated with descriptive 
attributes, and each interior node is a relation function, such as 
AND (n of n), OR (1of n), and n of m (m>n).  
Let be an access tree, and the root node is denoted by . 
At the beginning of the encryption, we will conduct a 
polynomial for each node from top to bottom, while the 
decryption order is reverse.  
To retrieve the secret, we define the Lagrange 
coefficient ,i S as follows: 
      For pi  , and for x S  ,  
     
, ( ) ,i S x j S j i
x j
i j =
−
 =
−

.  
IV. DESCRIPTION OF OUR SYSTEM 
A. System Model 
In our system, both Data Owners (denoted as DO) and 
Data Requester/Receivers (denoted as DR) are users, as shown 
in Fig.1. The Trusted Authority (TA) is a trusted party to 
generate Public Keys (PK), Master Keys (MK) for data 
encryption and Secret Key (SK) for each DR. Cloud 
Servers(CS) are assumed to be semi-trusted. We employ them 
to be in charge of storing our encrypted data. 
B. Encryption/Decryption and transmission in parallel 
We partition the file and the access tree into several blocks, 
which allows each data block to be encrypted and decrypted 
independently, paralleling to transmission and computation of 
the different data blocks. This reduces the response time of 
severs and shortens the DR’s wait time.  
 
Fig. 1. System Model 
As long as one block has been encrypted, it can be 
transmitted, which allows another block to be encrypted at the 
same time. As shown in Fig. 2, we make T1  denote the total 
time of encryption and transmission of our scheme and T2  
denote the time of CP-ABE. The diagram below shows the 
advantage of the improved scheme. 
 
Fig. 2. The encryption-transmission time comparison between our scheme and 
CP-ABE 
As shown in Fig. 3, the similar situation occurs in 
decryption. DR decrypts one block, while others are being 
transmitting over the internet. We make T1 denote the total 
time of transmission and decryption of our scheme and T2  
denote the time of CP-ABE. The diagram shows the advantage 
of the improved scheme. 
 
Fig. 3. The transmission-decryption time comparison between our scheme and 
CP-ABE 
C. Algorithms 
1) Setup 
The TA will run this setup algorithm and generate a set of 
public parameters. First, it chooses a bilinear group 0G  of 
prime order p with generator g and several random exponents: 
, , pq   . We introduce hash functions (), ()v attH H  for 
plaintext and all of the attributes. The public key and the 
master key are published as: 
 
 
 
0 , , , ( , )
, , ,
PK G g h g e g g
MK g q k
 

= =
=
 () 
2) Key Generation 
DR should legally register to the TA, which will evaluate 
his attributes and generate a corresponding SK for him. The 
algorithm is as follows: 
    Key_Gen(PK, MK, S) →SK 
The set of attributes S will be the input and a corresponding 
key is the output. This algorithm first chooses Pr  and 
j Pr  at random for each attribute j S . q is one of the MK 
components. Then it computes the key as: 
 
ˆ, ,
       , ( ) , '
r
rq
r rj rj
j j
D g D gSK
j S D g H j D g


+ 
= = =
    = = 
 () 
3) Encryption 
This process involves several specific steps. DO first 
computes the message M with a hash function ()vH and MK , 
then he will partition the message M into several data blocks 
(DB) according to the level number of its access tree. Next, he 
will perform a XOR operation of two different data blocks. 
Finally, these data blocks will be encrypted and transmitted 
one by one. 
Data_Verification(M, PK, MK)→C  
This algorithm gets a message M and a hash function as 
inputs, computes and outputs:   
 ( )kvC H M=  
() 
It will be one components of the first ciphertext block 
(CTB1), and DR utilizes this parameter to verify the 
correctness of his decryption results.  
Data_Partition(M, n)→DBi 
DO constructs the access tree and gets its level number n. 
This algorithm takes the message and the number as input, 
partitioning and computing as follows: 
 
1 2 3, , ... nM M M M M→  
() 
 
1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3
1
, , ,...,
n n
DB M DB M M DB M M
DB M M−
= =  = 
= 
 () 
Finally, it outputs 1 2 3, , ,... nDB DB DB DB . 
DB_Encryption(DBi, ASi, PK)→CTBi 
This algorithm first selects 1 ps  for 
DB1 and 2 ps  for 
DB2 and generate the polynomials for the first level (it 
contains the root node ) of current access tree, which is 
similar to that of [4]. It will compute as follows: 
 
2
2
s
qSec g=  () 
 1
1 1 2( || ) ( , )
s
C DB Sec e g g
=  () 
 
1
1  
s
C h=  () 
We make each CTB contain the secret of the lower level to 
ensure that the corresponding CTB can be successfully 
decrypted.  
If the first level of the access tree contains leaf nodes, let 
Yl-1 be the set of leaf nodes, computing as follows: 
 1, 1,
(0) (0)
1 1, 1,
ˆ ˆ, , ' ( ( ))y y
q q
l y y ay Y C g C H att y−  = =  () 
All the polynomials (
1 2( ), ( )...n nq x q x ) that related to the 
interior nodes of the current level will be classified as the next 
level of the access structure ASi+1. 
The complete form of the first ciphertext block (CTB1) is 
as follows:  
 ( )1 1 1 1 1 1, 1,ˆ ˆ, , , , , , 'l l y yCTB T C C C y Y C C− −=    () 
Then the current CTB will be transmitted over the network 
to the CS. 
Except for the DB1, the calculation process of other DBs is 
the same. We choose DB2 as an example of the encryption. 
First, the algorithm gets s2 from the previous step and selects 
3 ps   for the next level and computes as follows: 
 
3
3
s
qSec g=  () 
 
3
2
2 2( || ) ( , )
s
sqC DB g e g g
=  () 
 22
s
C h=  () 
This level may contain several interior nodes. According 
to these polynomials, for each interior node Nj, the algorithm 
computes: 
 
2 (0)jj ns s q = −  () 
 2,
js
q
jC g

 =  () 
Similarly, the algorithm will generate a polynomial for 
each interior child node, which consists of the next level of AS. 
If the current level contains leaf nodes, let Yl-2 be the set of 
leaf nodes, computing as follows: 
 2, 2,
(0) (0)
2 2, 2,
ˆ ˆ, , ' ( ( ))  y y
q q
y y ay Y C g C H att y  = =  () 
The complete form of the current ciphertext block (CTB) 
is as follows:  
 ( )2 2 2 2 2, 2 2, 2,ˆ ˆ, , , , , , 'l j l y yCTB T C C C y Y C C− −=     () 
The construction of the other CTBs is also the same. 
 ( ), , ,ˆ ˆ, , , , , , 'i l i i i i j l i i y i yCTB T C C C y Y C C− −=     () 
4) Decryption 
Each CTB is encrypted under only one level rather than 
the whole access tree, here will not be any recursion algorithm 
within the calculation. Our scheme allows DRs to wait the 
other CTBs while decrypting one CTB. 
Decrypt_LeafNode (CTBi , SK, z)→Fz or⊥ 
We define the algorithm that takes CTB and SK as inputs. 
As long as a DR gets one CTB from CS, he will perform this 
algorithm:  
If the node z is a leaf node, let j=att(z), if j S , then, 
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Else, it returns⊥. 
All of the leaf nodes contained in this CTBi will be 
calculated, and the outputs will be stored. 
Decrypt_InteriorNode (Fz , Sx)→Fx or⊥ 
Let x be the parent node of these nodes z, let xS be the set 
of its child nodes. If ,x zz S F  =⊥ , the function returns ⊥. 
Else, we can get the parent node value by computing:  
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Decrypt_DB(CTBi , SK, Fx )→DBi , Seci+1 
DR will repeatedly call those two functions to gets all of 
the parent nodes value. If 1i  , as long as one of them is 
retrieved (assume that the parent node j is retrieved), this 
algorithm computes as follows: 
Set A as the intermediate result. 
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If 1i = , the algorithm computes as follows: 
 
2
21
1
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 1 1=DB M  () 
 
2
2
s
qSec g=  () 
Obviously, there is no guarantee that all CTBs will be 
successfully decrypted. Thus, all these CTBs, DBs and Sec 
parameters will be stored as inputs of the algorithm 
Decrypt_M(SCTB, SDB, SSec, SK). 
Decrypt_M(SCTB, SDB, SSec, SK)→M or⊥ 
If 1 DBDB S , which means his attributes don’t satisfy the 
access policy. Even with some other decrypted DBs, M cannot 
be retrieved at all. This algorithm outputs⊥. 
If CTBS   , for i CTBCTB S  , this algorithm computes as 
follows: 
 
1
1
1
ˆ( , ) ( || ) ( , ) ( , )
 
( , )
( , )
                   ||
i i
i
i
i
s s
s rqq q
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=
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Else, for j DBDB S  , the message M can be retrieved as 
follows: 
 
1 1 2 2 1 3 3 2
1
, , ,...
n n n
M M M DB M M DB M
M DB M −
= =  = 
= 
 () 
 1 2 3|| || ... || nM M M M M=  () 
Finally, it outputs M. 
5) Verification 
In our scheme, a complete message M is partitioned and 
encrypted into several CTBs. We define an algorithm to allow 
DR to verify the correctness of decryption. Before that, TA 
will get ( )kvC H M= from CS and randomly select pt  , 
computing as follows: 
 ( )( ) ( )           
t
k k tk
v vH M H M g g→ →  ()  
These two parameters will be stored as a tuple V:{V1, V2} 
and transmitted to DR. 
Verify_M(M, V, PK)→True or False 
First, DR will utilize the Hash function to calculate this M : 
 ( )vM H M→  ()  
Verify that: 
 2 1( ( ), ) ( , )ve H M V e V g=  ()  
If (33) exits,
 
this algorithm will output True. Else, it will 
output False. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. System Security 
We parallel the transmission and computation by 
partitioning the data and access tree into chunks, which 
reduces the response time of severs and the DR’s waiting time. 
The ways to encrypt and decrypt affect the security of the 
system. 
Theorem: The security of our system is no weaker than 
that of [4]. 
Proof: Although we partition the access tree and the 
message, the ways used for encryption and decryption is 
analogous to that in [4]. In our system, DB( 1i iM M−  ) is 
multiplied by ( , )
se g g  . 
In order to decrypt, an attacker clearly retrieves s either by 
decrypting the corresponding level of access tree or obtaining 
its Seci. Even it gets all the DBs by the latter way, it cannot 
retrieve any Mi without M1. However, the only way to get M1 
is to compute the access tree.  
B. Partition 
A complete tree will be partitioned into several levels, and 
each data block (DB) will be masked by a unique random 
number si chosen for one of these levels, which is different 
from any of the interior nodes value. We lower the difficulty 
of decryption, namely, as long as one interior node value 
contained in this level is retrieved, the DB can be successfully 
decrypted. It means that even the DR’s attributes don’t satisfy 
the access policy, he is able to get access to some of the DBs. 
Theorem: Partition doesn’t impact the security of our 
scheme. 
Proof: Compared with a complete tree, each level contains 
partial access policy. There is no other information being 
inserted into these partitioned ones. 
As for DBs, all of them are preprocessed except for the 
first one. Without the first one, even all the others are 
acquired, none of them can be retrieved. The only way to 
access to the first DB is to satisfy its access policy, which is 
the same as that of [4]. Thus, to partition the message and the 
tree doesn’t impact the security of the proposed scheme.  
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Numerical analysis 
In this paper, we partition a large file into several data 
blocks, which can be encrypted, decrypted, and transmitted 
concurrently. Therefore, we can be able to administer the 
encryption/decryption and the transmission of different blocks 
in parallel. Now, we give the efficiency analysis according to 
the process shown in Fig. 4. The time cost in each step is 
shown in Table I.  
TABLE I.  THE PARAMETERS IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Symbols Description 
n M is partitioned into n blocks. 
ETM Encryption time of a whole file 
ETi Encryption time of the a data block i. 
TTM Transmission Encryption time of a whole file 
TTi Transmission time of the a data block i. 
DTM Decryption time of the whole file. 
DTi
 
Decryption time of the a data block i. 
1) Encryption-Transmission 
The total time of traditional scheme [4] is, 
 M MET TT+  ()  
 If   i iTT ET  , the total time of our scheme is, 
 1 1i MET TT ET TT+  +  ()  
Else, the total time is, 
 n i M nTT ET ET TT+  +  ()  
We set T denotes the difference: 
 
1 1M M M M
M M M n M n
T ET TT ET TT ET ET
T ET TT ET TT TT TT
  + − −  −
  + − −  −
 ()  
For all of the data we suppose that there is no delay in the 
process of block encryption/decryption or transmission. 
Therefore, there is no time gap between two consecutive 
blocks in data block encryption, decryption, and transmission. 
Thus, in either case, 0T  . 
2) Transmission-Decryption 
The total time of traditional scheme [4] is, 
 M MTT DT+  ()  
 If   i iTT ET  , the total time of our scheme is, 
 i n M nTT DT TT DT+  +  ()  
Else, the total time is, 
 1 1i MTT DT DT TT+  +  ()  
We set T denotes the difference : 
 
1 1
M M n M M n
M M M M
T DT TT DT TT DT DT
T DT TT DT TT TT TT
  + − −  −
  + − −  −
 ()  
Ideally, 1,  M n MDT DT TT TT  . 
Thus, in either case, 0T  . 
B. Experimental results 
To evaluate the performance of our system, we 
implemented a testing environment with the help of the 
cpabe-toolkit [17]. 
Encryption and transmission can be concurrent based on 
data blocks. Compared to [4], the total time of encryption and 
transmission can be reduced. The results shown in Fig. 4(a) 
indicate that the total time drops as the size of message 
increases. 
We encrypt the message under an access tree that 
contained ten levels and a hundred leaf nodes. 
 
Fig. 4(a). Comparison of the encryption-transmission time between the 
tradition scheme in [4] and ours, when the size of message grows. 
To a certain extent, different decryption keys can affect 
the decryption time overhead. We use the same key to 
conduct the experiment. Compared with the transmission time, 
the decryption time is relatively short. So as shown in Fig. 
4(b), we select the difference to indicate the comparison 
between the traditional scheme and ours.  
 
Fig. 4(b). The transmission-decryption time difference between the tradition 
scheme in [4] and ours, when the size of message grows. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is a very hot topic to provide security for C-WSN. C-
WSN is suitable for being applied in industrial system, such 
as smart grid. In C-WSN based applications, mass data is 
collected by WSN and managed by the cloud efficiently. 
However, maintaining data security and system efficiency 
meanwhile in C-WSN is a challenging issue. Existing related 
schemes seldom take efficiency of data processing into 
consideration. To solve this problem, this paper proposes an 
efficient data outsourcing scheme based on CP-ABE, which 
can not only guarantee secure data access, but also reduce 
overall data processing time. The security analysis shows that 
the proposed scheme can meet the security requirement of C-
WSN. The evaluations show the advantages on the efficiency 
of data processing, especially for data encryption and data 
transmission.  
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